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Abstract
We study the problem of computing an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work
by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a
slight change to their model—modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that
maintain state —and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of
public-key encryption), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time. Our algorithm
works not only for games with a finite number of players, but also for constant-degree graphical
games.
As Nash equilibrium is a weak solution concept for extensive form games, we additionally
define and study an appropriate notion of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for computationally
bounded players, and show how to efficiently find such an equilibrium in repeated games (again,
making standard cryptographic hardness assumptions).
1 Introduction
The complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a fundamental question at the inter-
face of game theory and computer science. A celebrated sequence of results showed that the
complexity of finding a NE in a normal-form game is PPAD-complete [Chen and Deng 2006;
Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou 2006], even for 2-player games. Less restrictive concepts,
such as ǫ-NE for an inverse-polynomial ǫ, are just as hard [Chen, Deng, and Teng 2006]. This sug-
gests that these problems are computationally intractable.
There was some hope that the situation would be better in infinitely-repeated games. The Folk
Theorem (see [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] for a review) informally states that in an infinitely-
repeated game G, for any payoff profile that is individually rational, in that all players get more
than1 their minimax payoff (the highest payoff that a player can guarantee himself, no matter
what the other players do) and is the outcome of some correlated strategy in G, there is a Nash
equilibrium of G with this payoff profile. With such a large set of equilibria, the hope was that
finding one would be less difficult. Indeed, Littman and Stone [2005] showed that these ideas can
be used to design an algorithm for finding a NE in a two-player repeated game.
Borgs et al. [2010] (BC+ from now on) proved some results suggesting that, for more than
two players, even in infinitely-repeated games it would be difficult to find a NE. Specifically, they
showed that, under certain assumptions, the problem of finding a NE (or even an ǫ-NE for an
inverse-polynomial ǫ) in an infinitely repeated game with three or more players where there is a
discount factor bounded away from 1 by an inverse polynomial is also PPAD-hard. They prove this
by showing that, given an arbitrary normal-form game G with c ≥ 2 players, there is a game G′
1For our results, since we consider ǫ-NE, we can replace “more than” by “at least”.
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with c+1 players such that finding an ǫ/8c-NE for the repeated game based on G′ is equivalent to
finding an ǫ-NE for G.
While their proof is indeed correct, in this paper, we challenge their conclusion. If we take
seriously the importance of being able to find an ǫ-NE efficiently, it is partly because we have
computationally bounded players in mind. But then it seems reasonable to see what happens if we
assume that the players in the game are themselves computationally bounded. Like BC+, we assume
that players are resource bounded.2 Formally, we view players as probabilistic3 polynomial-time
Turing machines (PPT TMs). We differ from BC+ in two key respects. First, since we restrict to
(probabilistic) polynomial-time players, we restrict the deviations that can be made in equilibrium
to those that can be computed by such players; BC+ allow arbitrary deviations. Second, BC+
implicitly assume that players have no memory: they cannot remember computation from earlier
rounds. By way of contrast, we allow players to have a bounded (polynomial) amount of memory.
This allows players to remember the results of a few coin tosses from earlier rounds, and means
that we can use some cryptography (making some standard cryptographic assumptions) to try to
coordinate the players. We stress that this coordination happens in the process of the game play,
not through communication. That is, there are no side channels; the only form of “communication”
is by making moves in the game. We call such TMs stateful, and the BC+ TMs stateless. We note,
that without the restriction on deviations, there is no real difference between stateful TMs and
stateless TMs in our setting (since a player with unbounded computational power can recreate the
necessary state). With these assumptions (and the remaining assumptions of the BC+ model), we
show that in fact an ǫ-NE in an infinitely-repeated game can be found in polynomial time.
Our equilibrium strategy uses threats and punishment much in the same way that they are used
in the Folk Theorem. However, since the players are computationally bounded we can use cryptog-
raphy (we assume the existence of a secure public key encryption scheme) to secretly correlate the
punishing players. This allows us to overcome the difficulties raised by BC+. Roughly speaking, the
ǫ-NE can be described as proceeding in three stages. In the first stage, the players play a sequence
of predefined actions repeatedly. If some player deviates from the sequence, the second stage begins,
in which the other players use their actions to secretly exchange a random seed, through the use of
public-key encryption. In the third stage, the players use a correlated minimax strategy to punish
the deviator forever. To achieve this correlation, the players use the secret random seed as the seed
of a pseudorandom function, and use the outputs of the pseudorandom function as the source of
randomness for the correlated strategy. Since the existence of public-key encryption implies the
existence of pseudorandom functions, the only cryptographic assumption needed is the existence of
public-key encryptions—one of the most basic cryptographic hardness assumptions.
In the second part of the paper we show how to extend this result to a more refined solution
concept. While NE has some attractive features, it allows some unreasonable solutions. In particular,
the equilibrium might be obtained by what are arguably empty threats. This actually happens in
our proposed NE (and in the basic version of the folk theorem). Specifically, players are required
to punish a deviating player, even though that might hurt their payoff. Thus, if a deviation occurs,
it might not be the best response of the players to follow their strategy and punish; thus, such a
punishment is actually an empty threat.
To deal with this (well known) problem, a number of refinements of NE have been considered.
The one typically used in dynamic games of perfect information is subgame-perfect equilibrium,
suggested by Selten [1965]. A strategy profile is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if it is a NE at
2Although BC+ do not discuss modeling players in this way, the problem they show is NP-Hard is to find a
polynomial-time TM profile that implements an equilibrium. There is an obvious exponential-time TM profile that
implements an equilibrium: each TM in the profile just computes the single-shot NE and plays its part repeatedly.
3BC+ describe their TMs as deterministic, but allow them to output a mixed strategy. As they point out, there
is no difference between this formulation and a probabilistic TM that outputs a specific action; their results hold for
such probabilistic TMs as well.
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every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that at any history of the game (even
those that are not on any equilibrium path), if all the players follow their strategy from that point
on, then no player has an incentive to deviate. In the context of repeated games where players’
moves are observed (so that it is a game of perfect information), the folk theorem continues to
hold even if the solution concept used is subgame-perfect equilibrium [Aumann and Shapley 1994;
Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Rubinstein 1979].
We define a computational analogue of subgame-perfect equilibrium that we call computational
subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium, where the strategies involved are polynomial time, and deviating
players are again restricted to using polynomial-time strategies. There are a number of subtleties
that arise in defining this notion. While we assume that all actions in the underlying repeated game
are observable, we allow our TMs to also have memory, which means the action of A TM does not
depend only on the public history. Like subgame-perfect equilibrium, our computational solution
concept is intended to capture the intuition that the strategies are in equilibrium after any possible
deviation. This means that in a computational subgame-perfect equilibrium, at each history for
player i, player i must make a (possibly approximate) best response, no matter what his and the
other players’ memory states are.
To compute a computational subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium, we use the same basic strat-
egy as for NE, but, as often done to get a subgame-perfect equilibrium (for example
see [Fudenberg and Maskin 1986]), we limit the punishment phase length, so that the players are
not incentivized not to punish deviations. However, to prove our result, we need to overcome one
more significant hurdle. When using cryptographic protocols, it is often the case (and, specifically
is the case in the protocol used for NE) that player i chooses a secret (e.g., a secret key for a
public-key encryption scheme) as the result of some randomization, and then releases some public
information which is a function of the secret (e.g., a public key). After that public information has
been released, another party j typically has a profitable deviation by switching to the TM M that
can break the protocol—for every valid public information, there always exists some TM M that
has the secret “hardwired” into it (although there may not be an efficient way of finding M given
the information). We deal with this problem by doing what is often done in practice: we do not use
any key for too long, so that j cannot gain too much by knowing any one key.
A second challenge we face is that in order to prove that our new proposed strategies are even
an ǫ-NE, we need to show that the payoff of the best response to this strategy is not much greater
than that of playing the strategy. However, since for any polynomial-time TM there is always a
better polynomial-time TM that has just a slightly longer running time, this natural approach fails.
This instead leads us to characterize a class of TMs we can analyze, and show that any other TM
can be converted to a TM in this class that has at least the same payoff. While such an argument
might seem simple in the traditional setting, since we only allow for polynomial time TMs, in our
setting this turns out to require a surprisingly delicate construction and analysis to make sure this
converted TM does indeed has the correct size and running time.
The idea of considering resource-bounded agents has a long history in game theory. It is known,
for example, that cooperation is a NE of finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma with resource-bounded
players (see, e.g., [Neyman 1985; Rubinstein 1986; Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994]). The idea
of using the structure of the game as a means of correlation is used by Lehrer [1991] to show an
equivalence between NE and correlated equilbrium in certain repeated games with nonstandard
information structures. The use of cryptography in game theory goes back to Urbano and Vila
[2002, 2004], who also used it to do coordination between players. More recently, it has been used
by, for example, Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [2000].
The application of cryptography perhaps most closely related to ours is by Gossner [1998], who
uses cryptographic techniques to show how any payoff profile that is above the players’ correlated
minimax value can be achieved in a NE of a repeated game with public communication played by
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computationally bounded players. In [Gossner 2000], a strategy similar to the one that we use is
used to prove that, even without communication, the same result holds. Gossner’s results apply
only to infinitely-repeated games with 3 players and no discounting; he claims that his results do
not hold for games with discounting. Gossner does not discuss the complexity of finding a strategy
of the type that he shows exists.
Recently, Andersen and Conitzer [2013] described an algorithm for finding NE in repeated games
with more than two players with high probability in uniform games. However, this algorithm is not
guaranteed to work for all games, and uses the limit of means as its payoff criterion, and not
discounting.
There are a few recent papers that investigate solution concepts for extensive-form games in-
volving computationally bounded player [Kol and Naor 2008; Gradwohl, Livne, and Rosen 2013;
Halpern and Pass 2013]; some of these focus on cryptographic protocols [Kol and Naor 2008;
Gradwohl, Livne, and Rosen 2013]. Kol and Naor [2008] discuss refinements of NE in the con-
text of cryptographic protocols, but their solution concept requires only that on each history on
the equilibrium path, the strategies from that point on form a NE. Our requirement for the com-
putational subgame-perfect equilibrium is much stronger. Gradwohl, Livne and Rosen [2013] also
consider this scenario and offer a solution concept different from ours; they try to define when an
empty threat occurs, and look for strategy profiles where no empty threats are made. Again, our
solution concept is much stronger.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant definitions from
game theory and cryptography. In section 3, we define our notion of computational ǫ-NE and show
how find it efficiently for repeated games. In Section 4, we consider computational subgame-perfect
ǫ-equilibrium and show that it too can be found efficiently.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 One-shot games
We define a game G to be a triple ([c], A, ~u), where [c] = {1, . . . , c} is the set of players, Ai is the set
of possible actions for player i, A = A1× . . .×Ac is the set of action profiles, and ~u : A→ R
c is the
utility function (~ui(~a) is the utility of player i). A (mixed) strategy σi for player i is a probability
distribution over Ai, that is, an element of ∆(Ai) (where, as usual, we denote by ∆(X) the set of
probability distributions over the set X). We use the standard notation ~x−i to denote vector ~x with
its ith element removed, and (x′, ~x−i) to denote ~x with its ith element replaced by x
′.
Definition 2.1. (Nash Equilibrium) σ = (σ1, ..., σc) is an ǫ-NE of G if, for all players i ∈ [c] and
all actions a′i ∈ Ai, Eσ−i [ui(a
′
i,~a−i)] ≤ Eσ[ui(~a)] + ǫ.
A correlated strategy of a game G is an element σ ∈ ∆(A). It is a correlated equilibrium if, for
all players i, they have no temptation to play a different action, given that the action profile was
chosen according to σ. That is, for all players i for all ai ∈ Ai such that σi(ai) > 0, Eσ|aiui(ai,~a−i) ≥
Eσ|aiui(a
′
i,~a−i).
Player i’s minimax value in a game G is the highest payoff i can guarantee himself if the other
players are trying to push his payoff as low as possible. We call the strategy i plays in this case
a minimax strategy for i; the strategy that the other players use is i’s (correlated) punishment
strategy. (Of course, there could be more than one minimax strategy or punishment strategy for
player i.) Note that a correlated punishment strategy can be computed using linear programming.
Definition 2.2. Given a game G = ([c], A, ~u), the strategies ~σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) that minimize
maxσ′∈∆(Ai)E(σ′,~σ−i)[ui(~a)] are the punishment strategies against player i in G. If ~σ−i is a pun-
ishment strategy against player i, then mmi(G) = maxa∈Ai E~σ−i [ui(a, a−i)] is player i’s minimax
value in G
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To simplify the presentation, we assume all payoffs are normalized so that each player’s minimax
value is 0. Since, in an equilibrium, all players get at least their minimax value, this guarantees
that all players get at least 0 in a NE.
2.2 Infinitely repeated games
Given a normal-form game G, we define the repeated game Gt(δ) as the game in which G is played
repeatedly t times (in this context, G is called the stage game) and 1− δ is the discount factor (see
below). Let G∞(δ) be the game where G is played infinitely many times. An infinite history h in
this game is an infinite sequence 〈~a0,~a1, . . .〉 of action profiles. Intuitively, we can think of ~at as the
action profile played in the tth stage game. We often omit the δ in G∞(δ) if it is not relevant to the
discussion. Let HG∞ be the set of all possible histories of G
∞. For a history h ∈ HG∞ let G
∞(h)
the subgame that starts at history h (after |h| one-shot games have been played where all players
played according to h). We assume that G∞ is fully observable, in the sense that, after each stage
game, the players observe exactly what actions the other players played.
A (behavioral) strategy for player i in a repeated game is a function σ from histories of the
games to ∆(Ai). Note that a profile ~σ induces a distribution ρ~σ on infinite histories of play. Let
ρt~σ denote the induced distribution on H
t, the set of histories of length t. (If t = 0, we take H0 to
consist of the unique history of length 0, namely 〈 〉.) Player i’s utility if ~σ is played, denoted pi(~σ),
is defined as follows:
pi(~σ) = δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A
ρt+1~σ (h · ~a)[ui(~a)].
Thus, the discount factor is 1 − δ. Note that the initial δ is a normalization factor. It guarantees
that if ui(~a) ∈ [b1, b2] for all joint actions ~a in G, then i’s utility is in [b1, b2], no matter which
strategy profile ~σ is played.
In these game, a more robust solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium [Selten 1965],
which requires that the strategies form an ǫ-NE at every history of the game.
Definition 2.3. A strategy profile ~σ = (σ1, ..., σc), is a subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium of a repeated
game G∞, if, for all players i ∈ [c], all histories h ∈ HG∞ where player i moves, and all strategies
σ′ for player i,
phi ((σ
′)h, ~σh−i) ≤ p
h
i (~σ
h) + ǫ,
where phi is the utility function for player i in game G
∞(h), and σh is the restriction of σ to G∞(h).
2.3 Cryptographic definitions
For a probabilistic algorithm A and an infinite bit string r, A(x; r) denotes the output of A running
on input x with randomness r; A(x) denotes the distribution on outputs of A induced by considering
A(x; r), where r is chosen uniformly at random. A function ǫ : N → [0, 1] is negligible if, for every
constant c ∈ N, ǫ(k) < k−c for sufficiently large k.
We use a non-uniform security model, which means our attackers are non-uniform PPT algo-
rithm.
Definition 2.4. A non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine A is a sequence of proba-
bilistic machines A = {A1, A2, ...} for which there exists a polynomial d such that both |An|, the
description size of An (i.e., the states and transitions in An), and the running time of An are less
than d(i).
Alternatively, a non-uniform PPT machine can also be defined as a uniform PPT machine that
receives an advice string (for example, on an extra “advice” tape) for each input length. It is common
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to assume that the cryptographic building blocks we define next and use in our constructions are
secure against non-uniform PPT algorithms.
2.3.1 Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 2.5. A probability ensemble is a sequence X = {Xn}n∈N of probability distribution
indexed by N. (Typically, in an ensemble X = {Xn}n∈N, the support of Xn consists of strings of
length n.)
We now recall the definition of computational indistinguishability [Goldwasser and Micali 1984].
Definition 2.6. Two probability ensembles {Xn}n∈N, {Yn}n∈N are computationally indistinguish-
able if, for all non-uniform PPT TMs D, there exists a negligible function ǫ such that, for all
n ∈ N,
|Pr[D(1n,Xn) = 1]− Pr[D(1
n, Yn) = 1]| ≤ ǫ(n).
To explain the Pr in the last line, recall that Xn and Yn are probability distributions. Although we
write D(1n,Xn), D is a randomized algorithm, so what D(1
n,Xn) returns depends on the outcome
of random coin tosses. To be a little more formal, we should write D(1n,Xn, r), where r is an
infinitely long random bit strong (of which D will only use a finite initial prefix). More formally,
taking PrXn to be the joint distribution over strings (x, r) where x is chosen according to Xn and
r is chosen according to the uniform distribution on bit-strings, we want
|PrXn [{(x, r) : D(1
n, x, r) = 1}]− PrYn [{(y, r) : D(1
n, y, r) = 1}] | ≤ ǫ(n).
We similarly abuse notation elsewhere in writing Pr.
We often call a TM that is supposed to distinguish between two probability ensembles a distin-
guisher.
2.3.2 Pseudorandom Functions
Definition 2.7. A function ensemble is a sequence F = {Fn}n∈N of probability distributions such
that the support of Fn is a set of functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings. The uniform
function ensemble, denoted H = {Hn}n∈N, has Hn be the uniformly distribution over the set of all
functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
We have the same notion of computational indistinguishablity for function ensembles as we had
for probability ensembles, only that the distinguisher is now an oracle machine, meaning that it
can query the value of the function at any point with one computation step, although it does not
have the full description of the function. (See [Goldreich 2001] for a detailed description.)
We now define pseudorandom functions (see [Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali 1986]). Intu-
itively, this is a family of functions indexed by a seed, such that it is hard to distinguish a random
member of the family from a truly randomly selected function.
Definition 2.8. A pseudorandom function ensemble (PRF) is a set
{fs : {0, 1}
|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ such that the following conditions hold:
• (easy to compute) fs(x) can be computed by a PPT algorithm that is given s and x;
• (pseudorandom) the function ensemble F = {Fn}n∈N, where Fn is uniformly distributed over
the multiset {fs}s∈{0,1}n , is computationally indistinguishable from H.
6
We use the standard cryptographic assumption that a family of PRFs exists; this assump-
tion is implied by the existence of one-way functions [H˚astad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby 1999;
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali 1986]. We actually require the use of a seemingly stronger no-
tion of a PRF, which requires that an attacker getting access to polynomially many instances of a
PRF (i.e., fs for polynomially many values of s) still cannot distinguish them from polynomially
many truly random functions. Nevertheless, as we show in Appendix A, it follows using a standard
“hybrid” argument that any PRF satisfies also this stronger “multi-instance” security notion.
2.3.3 Public-key Encryption Schemes
We now define public-key encryption schemes. Such a scheme has two keys. The first is public and
used for encrypting messages (using a randomized algorithm). The second is secret and used for
decrypting. The keys are generated in such a way that the probability that a decrypted message is
equal to the encrypted message is equal to 1. The key generation algorithm takes as input a “security
parameter” k that is used to determine the security of the protocols (inuitively, no polynomial-time
attacker should be able to “break” the security of the protocol except possibly with a probability
that is a negligible function of k).
We now recall the formal definitions of public-key encryption schemes [Diffie and Hellman 1976;
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 1978; Goldwasser and Micali 1984].
Definition 2.9. Given a polynomial l, an l-bit public-key encryption scheme is a triple
Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) of PPT algorithms where (a) Gen takes a security parameter 1k as input
and returns a (public key, private key) pair; (b) Enc takes a public key pk and a message m in
a message space {0, 1}l(k) as input and returns a ciphertext Encpk(m); (c) Dec is a deterministic
algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext C as input and outputs m′ = Decsk(C), and
(d)
Pr
[
∃m ∈ {0, 1}l(k) such that Decsk(Encpk(m)) 6= m
]
= 0.
We next define a security notion for public-key encryption. Such a security notion considers an
adversary that is characterized by two PPT algorithms, A1 and A2. Intuitively, A1 gets as input
a public key that is part of a (public key, secret key) pair randomly generated by Gen, together
with a security parameter k. A1 then outputs two messages in {0, 1}
k (intuitively, messages it can
distinguish), and some side information that it passes to A2 (intuitively, this is information that A2
needs, such as the messages chosen; An example of how this is used can be seen in Appendix B).
A2 gets as input the encryption of one of those messages and the side information passed on by A1.
A2 must output which of the two messages m0 and m1 the encrypted message is the encryption of
(where an output of b ∈ {0, 1} indicates that it is mb). Since A1 and A2 are PPT algorithms, the
output of A2 can be viewed as a probability distribution over {0, 1}. The scheme is secure if the
two ensembles (i.e., the one generated by this process where the encryption of m0 is always given
to A2, and the one where the encryption of m1 is always given to A2) are indistinguishable. More
formally:
Definition 2.10 (Public-key security). An l-bit public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec)
is secure if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A = (A1, A2), the ensembles
{INDΠ0 (A, k)}k and {IND
Π
1 (A, k)}k are computationally indistinguishable, where {IND
Π
b (A, k)}k is
the following PPT algorithm:
INDΠb (A, k) := (pk, sk)← Gen(1
k)
(m0,m1, τ)← A1(1
k, pk) (m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}
k)
C ← Encpk(mb)
o← A2(C, τ)
Output o.
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Intuitively, the ← above functions as an assignment statement, but it is not quite that, since the var-
ious algorithms are actually PPT algorithms, so their output is randomized. Formally, INDΠb (A, k)
is a probability distribution, which we can write as INDΠb (A, k, r1, r2, r3, r4), where we view r1, r2,
r3, and r4 as the random bitstrings that serve as the second arguments of Gen, A1, Encpk, and A2,
respectively. Once we add these arguments (considering, e.g., Gen(1k, r1) and A1(1
k, pk, r2) rather
than Gen(1k) and A1(1
k, pk)) these algorithms become deterministic, and ← can indeed be viewed
as an assignment statement.
We assume a secure public-key encryption scheme exists. We actually require a seemingly
stronger notion of “multi-instance” security, where an attacker gets to see encryptions of multi-
ple messages, each of which is encrypted using multiple keys.
Definition 2.11. An l-bit public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is multi-message
multi-key secure if, for all polynomials f and g, and for every probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary A = (A1, A2), the ensembles {IND-MULT
Π
0 (A, k, f, g)}k and {IND-MULT
Π
1 (A, k, f, g)}k are
computationally indistinguishable, where
IND-MULTΠb (A, k, f, g) :=
(pk1, sk1)← Gen(1
k), . . . (pkg(k), skg(k))← Gen(1
k),
(m10, . . . ,m
f(k)
0 ,m
1
1, . . . ,m
f(k)
1 , τ)← A1(1
k, pk1, . . . , pkg(k)) (m
i
0,m
i
1 ∈ {0, 1}
k)
C ← Encpk1(m
1
b), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m
1
b), . . . ,Encpk1(m
f(k)
b ), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m
f(k)
b )
o← A2(C, τ)
Output o
In this definition, there are polynomially many messages being encrypted, and each message
is encrypted a polynomial number of times, using a different key each time. Other than that, the
process is similar to the standard definition of security. As we show in Appendix B, any secure
encryption scheme is also multi-message multi-key secure.
3 The complexity of finding ǫ-NE in repeated games played by
stateful machines
3.1 Computational NE Definition
Since we consider computationally-bounded players, we take a player’s strategy in G∞ to be a
(possibly probabilistic) Turing machine (TM), which outputs at each round an action to be played,
based on its internal memory and the history of play so far. (The TMs considered in BC+ did not
have internal memory.) We consider only TMs that at round t use polynomial in nt many steps to
compute the next action, where n is the maximum number of actions a player has in G. Thus, n is
a measure of the size of G.4 Denote by Mi the TM used by player i, and let ~M = (M1, . . . ,Mc).
Note that a profile ~M induces a distribution ρ ~M on infinite histories of play. Let ρ
t
~M
denote the
induced distribution on Ht, the set of histories of length t. (If t = 0, we take H0 to consist of the
unique history of length 0, namely 〈 〉.) Player i’s utility if ~M is played, denoted pi( ~M ), is defined
as follows:
pi( ~M ) = δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A
ρt+1~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)].
4When we talk about polynomial-time algorithms, we mean polynomial in n. We could use other measures of the
size of G, such as the total number of actions. Since all reasonable choices of size are polynomially related, the choice
does not affect our results.
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Thus, the discount factor is 1 − δ. Note that the initial δ is a normalization factor. It guarantees
that if ui(~a) ∈ [b1, b2] for all joint actions ~a in G, then i’s utility is in [b1, b2], no matter which TM
profile ~M is played.
We are now ready to define the notion of equilibrium we use. Intuitively, as we model players as
polynomial-time TMs, we consider a profile of TMs an equilibrium in a game if there is no player
and no other polynomial-time TM that gives that player a higher expected payoff (or up to an ǫ
for an ǫ-NE).
Since we consider (probabilistic) TMs that run in polynomial time in the size of the game, we
cannot consider a single game. For any fixed game, running in polynomial time in the size of the
game is meaningless. Instead, we need to consider a sequence of games. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 3.1. An infinite sequence of strategy profiles ~M1, ~M2, . . ., where ~Mk = (Mk1 , ...,M
k
c ) is
an ǫ-NE of an infinite sequence of games G∞1 , G
∞
2 , . . . where the size of Gk is k if, for all players
i ∈ [c] and all non-uniform PPT adversaries M¯ (polynomial in k and t, as discussed above), there
exist k0 such that for all k ≥ k0
pki (M¯ , ~M
k
−i) ≤ p
k
i ( ~M
k) + ǫ(k).
where pki is the payoff of player i in game G
∞
k .
We note that the equilibrium definition we use considers only deviations that can be imple-
mented by non-uniform polynomial-time TMs. This is different from both the usual definition of
NE and from the definition used by BC+, who allow arbitrary deviations. But this difference is ex-
actly what allows us to use cryptographic techniques. The need to define polynomial-time deviation
is the reason for considering sequences of games instead of a single game. There are other reason-
able ways of capturing polynomial-time adversaries. As will be seen from our proof, our approach
is quite robust, so our results should hold for any reasonable definition.
3.2 Computing an equilibrium
In this section we describe the equilibrium strategy and show how to efficiently compute it. We
first start with some definition and tool we need for our proof.
3.2.1 Preliminaries
Definition 3.2. Let Ga,b,c,n be the set of all games with c players, at most n actions per player,
integral payoffs5, maximum payoff a, and minimum payoff b.
Note that by our assumption that the minimax payoff is 0 for all players, we can assume a ≥ 0,
b ≤ 0, and a − b > 0 (otherwise a = b = 0, which makes the game uninteresting). We start by
showing that, given a correlated strategy σ in a game G, players can get an average payoff that is
arbitrarily close to their payoff in σ by playing a fixed sequence of action profiles repeatedly.
Lemma 3.3. For all a, b, c, all polynomials q, all n, all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, and all correlated
strategies σ in G, if the expected payoff vector of playing σ is p then there exists a sequence sq of
length w(n), where w(n) = ((a− b)q(n) + 1)nc, such that player i’s average payoff in sq is at least
pi − 1/q(n).
5Our result also hold for rational payoffs except then the size of the game needs to take into account the bits
needed to represent the payoffs
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Proof. Given σ, we create sq the obvious way: by playing each action in proportion to the probability
σ(~a). More precisely, let r = a − b, and define w(n) = (rq(n) + 1)nc, as in the statement of the
lemma. We create a sequence sq by playing each action profile ~a ⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋ times, in some fixed
order. Notice that the length of this sequence is between w(n) − nc and w(n). The average payoff
player i gets in sq is
v′i =
1∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋
∑
~a∈A
⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋ui(~a)
≥
1∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋

 ∑
~a∈A,ui(~a)≥0
(w(n)σ(~a)− 1)ui(~a) +
∑
~a∈A,ui(~a)<0
w(n)σ(~a)ui(~a)


=
w(n)
∑
~a∈A σ(~a)ui(~a)∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋
−
∑
~a∈A,ui(~a)≥0
ui(~a)∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋
≥
w(n)pi∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋
−
anc
w(n)− nc
.
If pi < 0,
v′i ≥
w(n)pi∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋
−
anc
w(n)− nc
≥
w(n)pi − an
c
w(n)− nc
=
(rq(n) + 1)ncpi − an
c
(rq(n) + 1)nc − nc
=
rq(n)ncpi − (a− pi)n
c
rq(n)nc
≥ pi −
1
q(n)
.
If pi ≥ 0,
v′i ≥
w(n)pi∑
~a∈A⌊w(n)σ(~a)⌋
−
anc
w(n)− nc
≥ pi −
anc
w(n)− nc
= pi −
anc
(rq(n) + 1)nc − nc
= pi −
anc
rq(n)nc
≥ pi −
1
q(n)
.
Lemma 3.4. For all a, b, c, all polynomials q and w, all G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, and all sequences sq
of length w(n), if the average payoff vector of playing sq is p, then for all δ ≤ 1/f(n), where
f(n) = (a − b)w(n)q(n), if sq is played infinitely often, player i’s payoff in G∞(δ) is at least
pi − 1/q(n).
Proof. Suppose that sq = (a0, . . . , aw(n)−1), and let vi be i’s payoff from sq
∞ in G∞(δ). Then
vi = δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tw(n)
w(n)−1∑
k=0
u(ak)(1− δ)
k
= pi + δ
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tw(n)
w(n)−1∑
k=0
(u(ak)− pi)(1 − δ)
k.
We want to bound the loss from the second part of the sum. Notice that this is a discounted
sum of a sequence whose average payoff is 0. Call this sequence sq ′. Observe that, because of the
discounting, in the worst case, i gets all of his negative payoff in the first round of sq ′ and all his
positive payoffs in the last round. Thus, we can bound the discounted average payoff by analyzing
this case. Let the sum of i’s negative payoffs in sq ′ be Pneg, which means that the sum of i’s positive
payoffs must be −Pneg. Let r = a− b, let v
′
i = min~a∈A(ui(~a)− pi) ≥ −r, and let f(n) = rw(n)q(n),
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as in the statement of the lemma. So, if δ ≤ 1/f(n), player i′s average discounted payoff in the
game is at least
vi ≥ pi + δ
∞∑
t=0
Pneg(1− δ)
w(n)t + (−Pneg)(1− δ)
w(n)(t+1)−1
= pi + δ(Pneg + (−Pneg)(1 − δ)
w(n)−1)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)w(n)t
= pi + δ(Pneg + (−Pneg)(1 − δ)
w(n)−1)
1
1− (1− δ)w(n)
= pi + Pnegδ
1− (1− δ)w(n)−1
(1− (1− δ)w(n))
≥ pi + δPneg ≥ pi +
Pneg
f(n)
≥ pi +
v′iw(n)
f(n)
= pi − 1/q(n).
The next lemma shows that, for every inverse polynomial, if we “cut off” the game after some
appropriately large polynomial p number of rounds (and compute the discounted utility for the
finitely repeated game considering only p(n) repetitions), each player’s utility in the finitely repeated
game is negligibly close to his utility in the infinitely repeated game—that is, the finitely repeated
game is a “good” approximation of the infinitely repeated game.
Lemma 3.5. For all a, b, c, all polynomials q, all n, all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, all 0 < δ < 1, all
strategy profiles ~M , and all players i, i’s expected utility pi[ ~M ] in game G
⌈n/δ⌉(δ) and pi[ ~M ] in
game G∞(δ) differ by at most a/en.
Proof. Let pti(
~M) denote player i’s expected utility if the players are playing ~M and the game ends
at round t. Recall that (1− δ)1/δ ≤ 1/e.
p∞i (
~M)− p
⌈n/δ⌉
i (
~M)
= δ
∑∞
t=0(1− δ)
t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A ρ
t+1
~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)]− δ
∑⌈n/δ⌉
t=0 (1− δ)
t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A ρ
t+1
~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)]
= δ
∑∞
t=⌈n/δ⌉+1(1− δ)
t
∑
h∈Ht,~a∈A ρ
t+1
~M
(h · ~a)[ui(~a)]
≤ δ
∑∞
t=⌈n/δ⌉(1− δ)
ta
= δ(1 − δ)⌈n/δ⌉
∑∞
t=0(1− δ)
ta = δ(1 − δ)⌈n/δ⌉ aδ ≤
a
en .
3.2.2 The ǫ-NE strategy and the algorithm
Let A0i ⊂ Ai be a non-empty set and let A
1
i = Ai \ A
0
i .
6 A player can broadcast an m-bit string
by using his actions for m rounds, by treating actions from A0i as 0 and actions from A
1
i as 1.
Given a polynomial φ (with natural coefficients), let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a multi-message multi-key
secure φ-bit, if the security parameter is k, the length of an encrypted message is z(k) for some
polynomial z. Let sq = (s1, s2 . . . , sm) be a fixed sequence of action profiles. Fix a polynomial-time
pseudorandom function ensemble {PS s : s ∈ {0, 1}
∗}. For a game G such that |G| = n, consider the
strategy σNE for player i in G∞(δ) that has the following three phases. Phase 1 explains what to
do if no deviation occurs: play sq . Phase 2 gives the preliminaries of what to do if a deviation does
occur: roughly, compute a random seed that is shared with all the non-deviating players. Phase 3
explains how to use the random seed to produce a correlated punishment strategy that punishes
the deviating player. Formally let ~Mσ
NE
be the TMs that implement the following strategy:
6We assume that each player has at least two actions in G. This assumption is without loss of generality—we can
essentially ignore players for whom it does not hold.
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1. Play according to sq (with wraparound) as long as all players played according to sq in the
previous round.
2. After detecting a deviation by player j 6= i in round t0:
7
(a) Generate a pair (pki, ski) using Gen(1
n). Store ski in memory and use the next l(n)
rounds to broadcast pki, as discussed above.
(b) If i = j + 1 (with wraparound), player i does the following:
• i records pkj′ for all players j
′ /∈ {i, j};
• i generates a random n-bit seed seed ;
• for each player j′ /∈ {i, j}, i computes m = Encpkj′ (seed), and uses the next
(c− 2)z(n) rounds to communicate these strings to the players other than i and
j (in some predefined order).
(c) If i 6= j + 1, player i does the following:
• i records the actions played by j + 1 at time slots designated for i to retrieve
EncPki(seed);
• i decrypts to obtain seed , using Dec and ski.
3. Phase 2 ends after φ(n)+(c−2)z(n) rounds. The players other than j then compute PS seed (t)
and use it to determine which action profile to play according to the distribution defined by
a fixed (correlated) punishment strategy against j.
Note that if the players other than j had played a punishment strategy against j, then j
would get his minimax payoff of 0. What the players other than j are actually doing is playing
an approximation to a punishment strategy in two senses: first they are using a psuedorandom
function to generate the randomness, which means that they are not quite playing according to
the actual punishment strategy. Also, j might be able to guess which pure strategy profile they
are actually playing at each round, and so do better than his minimax value. As we now show, j’s
expected gain during the punishment phase is negligible.
Lemma 3.6. For all a, b, c, all polynomials t and f , all n, and all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, in
G∞(1/f(n)), if the players other than j play ~Mσ
NE
−j , then if j deviates at round t(n), j’s expected
payoff during the punishment phase is negligible.
Proof. Since we want to show j’s expected payoff during the punishment phase (phase (3) only) is
negligible, it suffices to consider only polynomially many rounds of playing phase (3) (more precisely,
at most nf(n) rounds); by Lemma 3.5, any payoff beyond then is guaranteed to be negligible due
to the discounting.
We construct three variants of the strategy ~Mσ
NE
−j , that vary in phases (2) and (3). We can
think of these variants as interpolating between the strategy above and the use of true randomness.
(These variants assume an oracle that provides appropriate information; these variants are used
only to make the claims precise.)
H1 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. For each player j′ not
being punished, player j + 1 then encrypts the seed 0 using (j′)’s public key, and then sends
the encrypted key to j′. In phase (3), the punishing players get the output of a truly random
function (from an oracle), and use it to play the true punishment strategy. (In this case, phase
(2) can be eliminated.)
7If more than one player deviates while playing sq , the players punish the one with the smaller index. The punished
player plays his best response to what the other players are doing in this phase.
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H2 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j+1. For each player j′ not being
punished, player j+1 encrypts the seed 0 using (j′)’s public key, and then sends the encrypted
key to j′. In phase (3), the punishing players get a joint random seed seed (from an oracle)
and use the outputs of PS seed to decide which strategy profile to play in each round. (Again,
in this case, phase (2) can be eliminated.)
H3 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. Player j + 1 chooses a
random seed seed and, for each player j′ not being punished, j + 1 encrypts seed using (j′)’s
public key, and then sends the encrypted key to j′. In phase (3), the punishing players use
the outputs of PS seed to decide which strategy profile to play in each round.
It is obvious that in H1, j’s expected payoff is negligible. (Actually, there is a slight subtlety
here. As we observed above, using linear programming, we can compute a strategy that gives the
correlated minimax, which gives j an expected payoff of 0. To actually implement this correlated
minimax, the players need to sample according to the minimax distribution. They cannot necessarily
do this exactly (for example, 1/3 can’t be computed exactly using random bits). However, given n,
the distribution can be discretized to the closest rational number of the form m/2n using at most n
random bits. Using such a discretized distribution, the players other than j can ensure that j gets
only a negligible payoff.)
We now claim that in H2, j’s expected payoff during the punishment phase is negligible.
Assume for contradiction that a player playing H2 has a non-negligible payoff µ(n) for all n
(i.e., there exists some polynomial g(·) such that µ(n) ≥ 1/g(n) for infinitely many n.). Let
h(n) = n(a− b)2(1/µ(n))2. We claim that if j’s expected payoff is non-negligible, then we can
distinguish h(n) instances of the PRF {PSs : s ∈ {0, 1}
n} with independently generated random
seeds, from h(n) independent truly random functions, contradicting the multi-instance security of
the PRF PS.
More precisely, we construct a distinguisher D that, given 1n and oracle access to a set of func-
tions f1, f2, . . . , fh(n), proceeds as follows. It simulates H2 (it gets the description of the machines
to play as its non-uniform advice) h(n) times where in iteration i′, it uses the function f i
′
as the
randomization source of the correlated punishment strategy. D then computes the average payoff
of player j in the h(n) runs, and outputs 1 if this average exceeds µ(n)/2. Note that if the functions
f1, f2, . . . , fh(n) are truly independent random functions, then D perfectly simulates H1 and thus,
in each iteration i′, the expected payoff of player j (during the punishment phase) is negligible. On
the other hand, if the functions f1, f2, . . . , fh(n) are h(n) independent randomly chosen instances
of the PRF {PSs : s ∈ {0, 1}
n}, then D perfectly simulates H2, and thus, in each iteration i
′, the
expected payoff of player j (during the punishment phase) is at least µ(n).
By Hoeffding’s inequality [Hoeffding 1963], given m random variables X1, . . . ,Xm all of which
take on values in an interval of size c′, p(|X − E(X)| ≥ r) ≤ 2 exp(−2mr
2
c′2 ) . Since, in this setting,
the range of the random variables is an interval of size a − b, the probability that D outputs 1
when the function are truly independent is at most 2/en, while the probability that D outputs 1
when the functions are independent randomly chosen instances of the PRF {PSs : s ∈ {0, 1}
n} is
at least 1− 2/en. This, in turn, means that the difference between them is not negligible, which is
a contradiction. Thus, j’s expected payoff in H2 must be negligible.
We now claim that in H3, player j’s expected payoff during the punishment phase is also
negligible. Indeed, if j can get a non-negligible payoff, then we can break the multi-message multi-
key secure encryption scheme.
Again, assume for contradiction that the punished player’s expected payoff in the punishment
phase is a non-negligible function µ(n) for all n. We can build a distinguisher A = (A1, A2)
(which also gets the description of the machines to play as its non-uniform advice) to distinguish
{IND-MULTΠ0 (A,n, h, c)}n and {IND-MULT
Π
1 (A,n, h, c)}n (where we abuse notation and identify
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c with the constant polynomial that always returns c). Given n, A1 randomly selects h(n) messages
r1, . . . , rh(n) and outputs (0, . . . , 0, r1, . . . , rh(n), (pk1, . . . , pkc)). A2 splits its input into pieces. The
first piece contains the first c encryptions in C (i.e., the c encryptions of the first message chosen,
according to the c different encryption functions), the second the next c encryptions and so on.
Notice that each piece consists of c different encryptions of the same message in both cases. It can
also simulate phase (1) by following the strategy for t rounds. It then uses each piece, along with
the public keys, to simulate the communication in phase (2). For piece j it uses rj as the seed of
the PRF in phase (3). It repeats this experiment for all the different pieces of the input, for a total
of h(n) times, and outputs 1 if the punished player’s average payoff over all experiments using its
strategy is more than µ(n)/2.
Note that if b = 1, player j faces H3 (i.e., the distributions over runs when b = 1 is identical
to the distribution over runs with H3, since in both cases the seed is chosen at random and the
corresponding messages are selected the same way), so player j’s expected payoff in the punishment
phase is µ(n). Thus, by Hoeffding’s inequality the probability that player j’s average payoff in the
punishment phase is more then µ(n)/2 is 1 − 2/en, so A2 outputs 1 with that probability in the
case b = 1. On the other hand, if b = 0, then this is just H2. We know player j’s expected payoff in
the punishment phase in each experiment is no more than negligible in H2, so the probability that
the average payoff is more than µ(n)/2 after h(n) rounds, is negligible. This means that there is a
non-negligible difference between the probability A outputs 1 when b = 1 and when b = 0, which
contradicts the assumption that the encryption scheme is multi-message multi-key secure public
key secure. Thus, the gain in H3 must be negligible.
H3 is exactly the game that the punished player faces; thus, this shows he can’t hope to gain
more than a negligible payoff in expectation.
We can now state and prove our main theorem, which says that σNE is an ǫ-NE for all inverse
polynomials ǫ and the can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.7. For all a, b, c, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a polynomial-time
algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with G
j ∈ Ga,b,c,j and for all inverse
polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of F given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs is a
1
q -NE for G
∞
1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
Proof. Given a game Gn ∈ G(a, b, c, n), the first step of the algorithm is to find a correlated
equilibrium σ of Gn. This can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. Since the
minimax value of the game is 0 for all players, all players have an expected utility of at least 0 using
σ. Let r = a− b. By Lemma 3.3, we can construct a sequence sq of length w(n) = (3rnq(n) + 1)nc
that has an average payoff for each player that is at most 1/3q(n) less than his payoff using σ. By
Lemma 3.4, it follows that by setting the discount factor δ < 1/f ′(n), where f ′(n) = 3rw(n)q(n),
the loss due to discounting is also at most 1/3q(n). We can also find a punishment strategy against
each player in polynomial time, using linear programming.
We can now compute the strategy ~Mσ
NE
described earlier that uses the sequence sq and the
punishment strategies. Let ~σ∗n be this strategy when given gn as input. Let m(n) be the length of
phase (2). (Note that m(n) is a polynomial that depends only on the choice of encryption scheme—
that is, it depends on l, where an l-bit public-key encryption scheme is used, and on z, where z(k)
is the length of encrypted messages.) Let
f(n) = max(3q(n)(m(n)a + 1), f ′(n)).
Notice that f is independent of the actual game as required.
We now show that ~σ∗1 , . . . as defined above is a (1/q)-NE. If in game G
n a player follows σ∗n, he
gets at least −2/3q(n). Suppose that player j defects at round t; that is, that he plays according
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to σ∗n until round t, and then defects. By Lemma 3.5 if t >
n
δ(n) , then any gain from defection is
negligible, so there exists some n1 such that, for all n > n1, a defection in round t cannot result
in the player gaining more than 1q(n) . If player j defects at round t ≤
n
δ(n) , he gets at most a for
the duration of phase (2), which is at most m(n) rounds, and then, by Lemma 3.6, gains only a
negligible amount, say ǫneg(n) (which may depend on the sequence of deviations), in phase (3). Let
uni be the payoff of player i in game G
n of the sequence. It suffices to show that
δ(n)(
t∑
k=0
uni (ak)(1− δ(n))
k +
m(n)∑
k=0
a(1− δ(n))k+t + (1− δ(n))t+m(n)ǫneg(n))− 1/q(n)
≤ δ(n)(
t∑
k=0
uni (ak)(1 − δ(n))
k +
∞∑
k=t
uni (ak)(1 − δ(n))
k).
By deleting the common terms from both side, rearranging, and noticing that
(1− δ(n))m(n)ǫneg(n) ≤ ǫneg(n), it follows that it suffices to show
δ(n)(1 − δ(n))t(
m(n)∑
k=0
a(1− δ(n))k + ǫneg(n))−
1
q(n)
≤ δ(n)(1 − δ(n))t(
∞∑
k=0
uni (ak+t)(1− δ(n))
k).
We divide both sides of the equation by (1 − δ(n))t . No matter at what step of the sequence
the defection happens, the future expected discounted payoff from that point on is still at least
−2/3q(n), as our bound applies for the worst sequence for a player, and we assumed that in
equilibrium all players get at least 0. It follows that we need to show
δ(n)(
m(n)∑
k=0
a(1− δ(n))k + ǫneg(n))−
1
q(n)(1− δ(n))t
≤ −
2
3q(n)
.
Since ǫneg is negligible for all deviations, it follows that, for all sequences of deviations, there exists
n0 such that ǫneg(n) < 1 for all n ≥ n0. For n ≥ n0,
δ(n)(
∑m(n)
k=0 a(1− δ(n))
k + ǫneg(n))−
1
q(n)(1−δ(n))t
≤ δ(n)(m(n)a + ǫneg(n))−
1
q(n)
≤
m(n)a+ǫneg(n)
f(n) −
1
q(n)
≤
m(n)a+ǫneg(n)
3q(n)(m(n)a+1) −
1
q(n)
≤ 13q(n) −
1
q(n)
= − 23q(n) .
This shows that there is no deviating strategy that can result in the player gaining more than 1q(n)
in Gn for n > max{n0, n1}.
3.3 Dealing with a variable number of players
Up to now, we have assumed, just as in Borgs et al. [2010], that the number of players in the game
is a fixed constant (≥ 3).
What happens if the number of players in the game is part of the input? In general, describing
the players’ utilities in such a game takes space exponential in the number of players (since there are
exponentially many strategy profiles). Thus, to get interesting computational results, we consider
games that can be represented succinctly.
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Graphical games [Kearns, Littman, and Singh 2001] of degree d are games that can be repre-
sented by a graph in which each player is a node in the graph, and the utility of a player is a
function of only his action and the actions of the players to which he is connected by an edge. The
maximum degree of a node is assumed to be at most d. This means a player’s punishment strategy
depends only on the actions of at most d players.
Definition 3.8. Let G′a,b,d,n,m be the set of all graphical games with degree at most d, at most m
players and at most n actions per player, integral payoffs,8 maximum payoff a, and minimum payoff
b.
The following corollary then follows from our theorem, the fact that a cor-
related equilibrium with polynomial sized-support can be computed in polynomial
time [Jiang and Leyton-Brown 2011], and the observation that we can easily compute a cor-
related minimax strategy that depends only on the action of at most d players.
Corollary 3.9. For all a, b, d, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a polynomial-
time algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with G
j ∈ Ga,b,d,j,j and for all
inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of F given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs
is a 1q -equilibrium for G
∞
1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
4 Computational subgame-perfect equilibrium
4.1 Motivation and Definition
In this section we would like to define a notion similar to subgame-perfect equilibrium, where for
all histories h in the game tree (even ones not on the equilibrium path), playing ~σ restricted to the
subtree starting at h forms a NE. This means that a player does not have any incentive to deviate,
no matter where he finds himself in the game tree.
As we suggested in the introduction, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed in
formalizing this intuition in our computational setting. First, since we consider stateful TMs, there
is more to a descriptione of a situation than just the history; we need to know the memory state of
the TM. That is, if we take a history to be just a sequence of actions, then the analogue of history
for us is really a pair (h, ~m) consisting of a sequence h of actions, and a profile of memory states,
one for each player. Thus, to be a computational subgame-perfect equilibrium the strategies should
be a NE at every history and no matter what the memory states are.
Another point of view is to say that the players do not in fact have perfect information in our
setting, since we allow the TMs to have memory that is not observed by the other players, and thus
the game should be understood as a game of imperfect information. In a given history h where i
moves, i’s information set consists of all situations where the history is h and the states of memory of
the other players are arbitrary. While subgame-perfect equilibrium extends to imperfect information
games it usually doesn’t have much bite (see [Kreps and Wilson 1982] for a discussion on this point).
For the games that we consider, subgame-perfect equilibrium typically reduces to NE. An arguably
more natural generalization of subgame-perfect equilibrium in imperfect-information games would
require that if an information set for player i off the equilibrium path is reached, then player i’s
strategy is a best response to the other players’ strategies no matter how that information set is
reached. This is quite a strong requirement. (see [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994][pp. 219–221] for a
discussion of this issue); such equilibria do not in general exist in games of imperfect information.
Instead, in games of imperfect information, the solution concept most commonly used is sequen-
tial equilibrium [Kreps and Wilson 1982]. A sequential equilibrium is a pair (~σ, µ) consisting of a
8Again, our result also holds for rational payoffs, except then the size of the game needs to take into account the
bits needed to represent the payoffs.
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strategy profile ~σ and a belief system µ, where µ associates with each information set I a probability
µ(I) on the nodes in I. Intuitively, if I is an information set for player i, µ(I) describes i’s beliefs
about the likelihood of being in each of the nodes in I. Then (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium
if, for each player i and each information set I for player i, σi is a best response to ~σ−i given
i’s beliefs µ(I). However, a common criticism of this solution concept is that it is unclear what
these beliefs should be and how players create these beliefs. Instead, our notion of computational
subgame-perfection can be viewed as a strong version of a sequential equilibrium, where, for each
player i and each information set I for i, σi is a best response to ~σ−i conditional on reaching I (up
to ǫ) no matter what i’s beliefs are at I.
As a deviating TM can change its memory state in arbitrary ways, when we argue that a strategy
profile is an ǫ-NE at a history, we must also consider all possible states that the TM might start
with at that history. Since there exists a deviation that just rewrites the memory in the round just
before the history we are considering, any memory state (of polynomial length) is possible. Thus,
in the computational setting, we require that the TM’s strategies are an ǫ-NE at every history,
no matter what the states of the TMs are at that history. This solution concept is in the spirit
of subgame-perfect equilibrium, as we require that the strategies are a NE after every possible
deviation, although the player might not have complete information as to what the deviation is.
Intuitively, a profile ~M of TMs is a computational subgame-perfect equilibrium if for all players
i, all histories h where i moves, and all memory profiles ~m of the players, there is no polynomial-time
TM M¯ such that player i can gain more than ǫ by switching from Mi to M¯ . To make it precise, we
must again consider an infinite sequence of games of increasing size (just as we do for NE, although
this definition is more complicated since we must consider memory states).
For a memory state m and a TM M let M(m), stand for running M with initial memory state
m. We use ~M(~m) to denote (M1(m1), . . . ,Mc(mc)). Let p
G,δ
i (
~M ) denote player i’s payoff in G∞(δ)
when ~M is played.
Definition 4.1. An infinite sequence of strategy profiles ~M1, ~M2, . . ., where ~Mk = (Mk1 , ...,M
k
c ),
is a computational subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium of an infinite sequence G∞1 , G
∞
2 , . . . of
repeated games where the size of Gk is k, if, for all players i ∈ [c], all sequences
h1 ∈ HG∞1 , h2 ∈ HG∞2 , . . . of histories, all sequences ~m
1, ~m2, . . . of polynomial-length memory-state
profiles, where ~mk = (mk1 , . . . ,m
k
c ), and all non-uniform PPT adversaries M¯ (polynomial in k and
t, as discussed above), there exists k0 such that, for all k ≥ k0,
p
G∞
k
(hk),δ
i (M¯ (m
k
i ), ~M
k
−i(~m
k
−i)) ≤ p
G∞
k
(hk),δ
i (
~Mk(~mk)) + ǫ(k).
4.2 Computing a subgame-perfect ǫ-NE
For a game G such that |G| = n, and a polynomial ℓ, consider the following strategy σNE ,ℓ, and let
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
be the TMs that implement this strategy. This strategy is similar in spirit to that proposed
in Section 3.2.2; indeed, the first two phases are identical. The key difference is that the punishment
phase is played for only ℓ(n) rounds. After that, players return to phase 1. As we show, this limited
punishment is effective since it is not played long enough to make it an empty threat (if ℓ is chosen
appropriately). Phase 4 takes care of one minor issue: The fact that we can start in any memory
state means that a player might be called on to do something that, in fact, he cannot do (because
he doesn’t have the information required to do it). For example, he might be called upon to play
the correlated punishment strategy in a state where he has forgotten the random seed, so he cannot
play it. In this case, a default action is played. Note that his was not an issue in the analysis of NE.
1. Play according to sq (with wraparound) as long as all players played according to sq in the
previous round.
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2. After detecting a deviation by player j 6= i in round t0:
9
(a) Generate a pair (pki, ski) using Gen(1
n). Store ski in memory and use the next l(n)
rounds to broadcast pki, as discussed above.
(b) If i = j + 1 (with wraparound), player i does the following:
• i records pkj′ for all players j
′ /∈ {i, j};
• i generates a random n-bit seed seed ;
• for each player j′ /∈ {i, j}, i computes m = Encpkj′ (seed), and uses the next
(c− 2)z(n) rounds to communicate these strings to the players other than i and
j (in some predefined order).
(c) If i 6= j + 1, player i does the following:
• i records the actions played by j + 1 at time slots designated for i to retrieve
EncPki(seed);
• i decrypts to obtain seed , using Dec and ski.
3. Phase 2 ends after φ(n)+(c−2)z(n) rounds. The players other than j then compute PS seed (t)
and use it to determine which action profile to play according to the distribution defined by
a fixed (correlated) punishment strategy against j. Player j plays his best response to the
correlated punishment strategy throughout this phase. After ℓ(n) rounds, they return to phase
1, playing the sequence sq from the point at which the deviation occurred (which can easily
be inferred from the history).
4. If at any point less than or equal to φ(n) + (c − 2)z(n) time steps from the last deviation
from phase 1 the situation is incompatible with phase 2 as described above (perhaps because
further deviations have occurred), or at any point between φ(n)+ (c− 2)z(n) and φ(n)+ (c−
2)z(n) + ℓ(n) steps since the last deviation from phase 1 the situation is incompatible with
phase 3 as described above, play a fixed action for the number of rounds left to complete
phases 2 and 3 (i.e., up to φ(n) + (c− 2)z(n) + ℓ(n) steps from the last deviation from phase
1). Then return to phase 1.
Note that with this strategy a deviation made during the punishment phase is not punished. Phase
2 and 3 are always played to their full length (which is fixed and predefined by ℓ and z). We say
that a history h is a phase 1 history if it is a history where an honest player should play according
to sq . History h is a phase 2 history if it is a history where at most φ(n) + (c− 2)z(n) rounds have
passed since the last deviation from phase 1; h is a phase 3 history if more than φ(n) + (c− 2)z(n)
but at most φ(n) + (c − 2)z(n) + ℓ(n) rounds have passed since the last deviation from phase 1.
No matter what happens in phase 2 and 3, a history in which exactly φ(n) + (c − 2)z(n) + ℓ(n)
round have passed since the last deviation from phase 1 is also a phase 1 history (even if the players
deviate from phase 2 and 3 in arbitrary ways). Thus, no matter how many deviations occur, we
can uniquely identify the phase of each round.
We next show that by selecting the right parameters, these strategies are easy to compute and
are a subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium for all inverse polynomials ǫ.
Definition 4.2. Let Ga,b,c,n be the set of all games with c players, at most n actions per player,
integral payoffs, maximum payoff a, and minimum payoff b.
9Again, if more than one player deviates while playing sq , the players punish the one with the smaller index. The
punished player plays his best response to what the other players are doing in this phase.
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We first show that for any strategy that deviates while phase 1 is played, there is a strategy
whose payoff is at least as good and either does not deviate in the first polynomially many rounds,
or after its first deviation, deviates every time phase 1 is played. (Recall that after every deviation
in phase 1, the other players play the punishment phase for ℓ(n) rounds and then play phase 1
again.)
We do this by showing that if player i has a profitable deviation at some round t of phase 1, then
it must be the case that every time this round of phase 1 is played, i has a profitable deviation there.
(That is, the strategy of deviating every time this round of phase 1 is played is at least as good as
a strategy where player i correlates his plays in different instantiations of phase 1.) While this is
trivial in traditional game-theoretic analyses, naively applying it in the computational setting does
not necessarily work. It requires us to formally show how we reduce a polynomial time TM M to
a different TM M ’ of the desired form without blowing up the running time and size of the TM.
For a game G, let H1,n,fG∞ be the set of histories h of G
∞ of length at most nf(n) such that at
(the last node of) h, σNE ,ℓ is in phase 1. Let R(M) be the polynomial that bounds the running
time of TM M .
Definition 4.3. Given a game G, a deterministic TM M is said to be (G, f, n)-well-behaved if,
when (M,σNE ,ℓ−i ) is played, then either M does not deviate for the first nf(n) rounds or, after M
first deviates, M continues to deviate from sq every time phase 1 is played in the next nf(n) rounds.
Lemma 4.4. For all a, b, c, and all polynomials f , there exists a polynomial g such that for all
n, all games G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, all h ∈ H
1,n,f
G∞ , all players i, and all TMs M , there exists a (G(h), f, n)-
well-behaved TM M’ such that p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (M
′, ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) ≥ p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ), and R(M
′), |M ′| ≤
g(R(M)).
Proof. Suppose that we are given G ∈ Ga,b,c,n, h ∈ H
1,n,f
G∞ , and a TM M . We can assume without
loss of generality that M is deterministic (we can always just use the best random tape). If M does
not deviate in the first nf(n) rounds of G(h)∞ then M ′ is just M , and we are done. Otherwise,
we construct a sequence of TMs starting with M that are, in a precise sense, more and more well
behaved, until eventually we get the desired TM M ′.
For t1 < t2, say that M is (t1, t2)-(G, f, n)-well-behaved if M does not deviate from sq until
round t1, and then deviates from sq every time phase 1 is played up to (but not including) round
t2 (by which we mean there exists some history in which M does not deviate at round t2 and this
is the shortest such history over all possible random tapes of ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ). We construct a sequence
M1,M2, . . . of TMs such that (a) M1 = M , (b) Mi is (t
i
1, t
i
2)-(G, f, n)-well-behaved, (c) either
ti+11 > ti or t
i+1
1 = t
i
1 and t
i+1
2 > t
i
2, and (d) p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (Mi+1,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) ≥ p
Gh,1/f(n)
i (Mi,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ).
Note that if t1 ≥ nf(n) or t2 ≥ t1 + nf(n), then a (t1, t2)-(G, f, n)-well-behaved TM is (G, f, n)-
well-behaved.
Let t < nf(n) be the first round at which M deviates. (This is well defined since the play up
to t is deterministic.) Let the history up to time t be ht. If M deviates every time that phase 1
is played for the nf(n) rounds after round t, then again we can take M ′ = M , and we are done.
If not, let t′ be the first round after t at which phase 1 is played and there exists some history of
length t′ at which M does not deviate. By definition, M is (t, t′)-(G, f, n)-well behaved. We take
M1 = M and (t
1
1, t
1
2) = (t, t
′). (Note that since ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i are randomized during phase 2, the first
time after t at which M returns to playing phase 1 and does not deviate may depend on the results
of their coin tosses. We take t′ to be the first time this happens with positive probability.)
Let sh
∗
be M ’s memory state at a history h∗. We assume for ease of exposition that M encodes
the history in its memory state. (This can be done, since the memory state at time t is of size
polynomial in t.) Consider the TMM ′′ that acts likeM up to round t, and copiesM ’s memory state
at that round (i.e., sh
t
).M ′′ continues to plays likeM up to the first round t′ with t < t′ < t+nf(n)
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at which σNE,ℓ would be about to return to phase 1 and M does not deviate (which means that M
plays an action in the sequence sq at round t′). At round t′, M ′′ sets its state to sh
t
and simulates
M from history ht with states sh(t); so, in particular, M ′′ does deviate at time t′. (Again, the time
t′ may depend on random choices made by ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i . We assume that M
′′ deviates the first time
M is about to play phase 1 after round t and does not deviate, no matter what the outcome of
the coin tosses.) This means, in particular, that M ′′ deviates at any such t′. We call M ′′ a type 1
deviation from M .
If p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M
′′, ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) > p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ), then we take M2 = M
′′. Note that
t21 = t
1
1 = t, while t
2
2 > t
1
2 = t
′, since M ′′ deviates at t′. If p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M
′′, ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) <
p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ), then there exists some history h
∗ of both M and M ′′ such that t <
|h∗| < t + nf(n), M ′′ deviates at h∗, M does not, and M has a better expected payoff than
M ′′ at h∗. (This is a history where the type 1 deviation failed to improve the payoff.) Take M2
to be the TM that plays like ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
i up to time t, then sets its state to s
h∗, and then plays
like M with state sh
∗
in history h∗. We call M2 a type 2 deviation from M . Note that M2
does not deviate at ht (since M did not deviate at history h∗). Let δ′ = (1 − δ)|h
∗|−|ht|. Clearly
δ′p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M2,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) = p
Gh
∗
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ), since
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i acts the same in G
ht and Gh
∗
.
Since M ′′ plays like M(sht) at h∗, p
Gh
∗
,1/f(n)
i (M
′′, ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) = δ
′p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ). Combining
this with the previous observations, we get that p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M2,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) ≥ p
Gh
t
,1/f(n)
i (M,
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ).
Also note that t21 > t
1
1. This completes the construction of M2. We inductively construct Mi+1,
i = 2, 3, . . ., just as we did M2, letting Mi play the role of M .
Next observe that, without loss of generality, we can assume that this sequence arises from a
sequnce of type 2 deviations, followed by a sequence of type 1 deviations: For let j1 be the first
point in the sequence at which a type 1 deviation is made. We claim that we can assume without
loss of generality that all further deviations are type 1 deviations. By assumption, since Mj1 gives
i higher utility than Mj1−1, it is better to deviate the first time Mj1−1 wants to play phase 1 again
after an initial deviation. This means that when Mj1 wants to play phase 1 again after an initial
deviation it must be better to deviate again, since the future play of the ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i is the same in both
of these situations. This means that once a type 1 deviation occurs, we can assume that all further
deviations are type 1 deviations.
Let Mj be the first TM in the sequence that is well behaved. (As we observed earlier, there
must be such a TM.) Using the fact that the sequence consists of a sequence of type 2 deviations
followed by a sequence of type 1 deviations, it is not hard to show that Mj can be implemented
efficiently. First notice that Mj1 is a TM that plays like
~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
i until some round, and then plays
M starting with its state at a history which is at most (nf(n))2 longer than the real history at
this point. This is because its initial history becomes longer by at most nf(n) at each round and
we iterate this construction at most nf(n) times. This means that its running time is obviously
polynomially related to the running time of the original M . The same is true of the size of Mj1 ,
since we need to encode only the state at this initial history and the history at which we switch,
which is polynomially related to R(M)(n).
To construct Mj , we need to modify Mj1 only slightly, since only type 1 deviations occur.
Specifically, we need to know only t1j1 and to encode its state at this round. At every history after
that, we run MJ1 (which is essentially running M on a longer history) on a fixed history, with a
potential additional step of copying the state. It is easy to see that the resulting TM has running
time and size at most O(R(M)).
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We now state and prove our theorem, which shows that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
for computing a subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium by showing that, for all inverse polynomials ǫ, there
exists a polynomial function ℓ of ǫ such that σNE
∗,ℓ is a subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium of the game.
The main idea of the proof is to show that the players can’t gain much from deviating while the
sequence is being played, and also that, since the punishment is relatively short, deviating while a
player is being punished is also not very profitable.
Theorem 4.5. For all a, b, c, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a polynomial-time
algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with G
j ∈ Ga,b,c,j and for all inverse
polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of F given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs is a
subgame-perfect 1q -equilibrium for G
∞
1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
Proof. Given a game Gn ∈ G(a, b, c, n), the algorithm finds a correlated equilibrium σ of Gn, which
can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. Each player’s expected payoff is at least
0 when playing σ, since we assumed that the minimax value of the game is 0. Let r = a − b. By
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, we can construct a sequence sq of length w(n) = 4(rnq(n) + 1)nc and
set f ′(n) = 4rw(n)q(n), so that if the players play sq infinitely often and δ < 1/f ′(n), then all the
players get at least −1/2q(n). The correlated punishment strategy against each player can also be
found in polynomial time using linear programming.
Let m(n) be the length of phase 2, including the round where the deviation occurred. (Note that
m(n) is a polynomial that depends only on the choice of encryption scheme—that is, it depends
on φ, where a φ-bit public-key encryption scheme is used, and on z, where z(k) is the length of
encrypted messages.) Let ℓ(n) = nq(n)(m(n)a+1), let σ∗n be the strategy ~M
σNE ,ℓ described above,
and let f(n) = max(3rq(n)(ℓ(n) +m(n)), f ′(n)).
We now show that σ∗1 , σ
∗
2 , . . . is a subgame-perfect (1/q)-equilibrium for every inverse polynomial
discount factor δ ≤ 1/f . We focus on deviations at histories of length < nδ(n) , since, by Lemma 3.5,
the sum of payoffs received after that is negligible. Thus, there exists some n0 such that, for all
n > n0, the payoff achieved after that history is less than 1/q(n), which does not justify deviating.
We first show that no player has an incentive to deviate in subgames starting from phase 1
histories. By Lemma 4.4, it suffices to consider only a deviating strategy that after its first deviation
deviates every time phase 1 is played; for every deviating strategy, either not deviating does at least
as well or there is a deviating strategy of this form that does at least as well. Let h1 be the history
in which the deviation occurs and let M be the deviating strategy. Notice that ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
can always
act as intended at such histories; it can detect it is in such a history and can use the history to
compute the next move (i.e., it does not need to maintain memory to figure out what to do next).
The player’s payoff from (M, ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) during one cycle of deviation and punishment can be at
most a at each round of phase 2 and, by Lemma 3.6, is negligible throughout phase 3. (We use ǫneg
to denote the negligible payoff to a deviator in phase 3.) Thus, the payoff of the deviating player
from (M, ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
−i ) from the point of deviation onwards is at most
((1 − δ(n)|h1|)
(
δ(n)(m(n)a + ǫneg)
⌈
nf(n)−|h1|
m(n)+ℓ(n)
⌉∑
t=0
(1− δ(n))(m(n)+ℓ(n))t + ǫ′neg
)
≤ ((1 − δ(n)|h1|)
(
δ(n)(m(n)a + ǫneg)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ(n))(m(n)+ℓ(n))t + ǫ′neg
)
,
where ǫ′neg is the expected payoff after round nf(n). By Lemma 3.3, no matter where in the
sequence the players are, the average discounted payoff at that point from playing honestly is
at least −1/2q(n). Thus, the payoff from playing ( ~Mσ
NE ,ℓ
) from this point onwards is at least
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−(1− δ(n))|h1 |)1/2q(n). We can ignore any payoff before the deviation since it is the same whether
or not the player deviates. and also divide both sides by (1 − δ(n))|h1|); thus, it suffices to prove
that
δ(n)(m(n)a + ǫneg)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ(n))(m(n)+ℓ(n))t + ǫ′neg ≤
1
2q(n)
.
The term on the left side is bounded by O
( m(n)a+ǫneg
nq(n)(m(n)a+1)
)
, and thus there exists n1 such that, for
all n > n1, the term on the left side is smaller than
1
2q(n) (In fact, for all constants c, there exists
nc such that the left-hand side is at most
1
cq(n) for any n > nc.)
We next show that no player wants to deviate in phase 2 or 3 histories. Notice that since these
phases are carried out to completion even if the players deviate while in these phases (we do not
punish them for that), and the honest strategy can easily detect whether it is in such a phase by
looking at when the last deviation from phase 1 occurred. First consider a punishing player. By not
following the strategy, he can gain at most r for at most ℓ(n)+m(n) rounds over the payoff he gets
with the original strategy (this is true even if his memory state is such that he just plays a fixed
action, or even if another player deviates while the phase is played). Once the players start playing
phase 1 again, our previous claim shows that no matter what the actual history is at that point, a
strategy that does not follow the sequence does not gain much. It is easy to verify that, given the
discount factor, a deviation can increase his discounted payoff by at most 1q(n) in this case. (Notice
that the previous claim works for any constant fraction of 1/q(n), which is what we are using here
since the deviation in the punishment phase gains 1/cq(n) for some c.)
The punished player can deviate to a TM that correctly guessed the keys chosen (or the current
TM’s memory state might contain the actual keys and he defects to a TM that uses these keys)
, in which case he would know exactly what the players are going to do while they are punishing
him. Such a deviation exists once the keys have been played and are part of the history. Another
deviation might be a result of the other TMs being in an inconsistent memory state, so that they
play a fixed action, one which the deviating player might be able to take advantage of. However,
these deviations work (or any other possible deviation) only for the current punishment phase.
Once the players go back to playing phase 1, this player can not gain much by deviating from the
sequence again. For if he deviates again, the other players will choose new random keys and a new
random seed (and will have a consistent memory state); from our previous claims, this means that
no strategy can gain much over a strategy that follows the sequence. Moreover, he can also gain at
most r for at most ℓ(n) +m(n) rounds which, as claimed before, means that his discounted payoff
difference is less than 1q(n) in this case.
This shows that, for n sufficiently large, no player can gain more than 1/q(n) from deviating at
any history. Thus, this strategy is a subgame-perfect 1/q-equilibrium.
Using the same arguments as in Section 3.3, we can also apply these ideas to efficiently find a
computational subgame-perfect ǫ-equilibrium in constant-degree graphical games.
Corollary 4.6. For all a, b, d, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a polynomial-
time algorithm F such that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with G
j ∈ Ga,b,d,j,j and for all
inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of F given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs
is a subgame-perfect 1q -equilibrium for G
∞
1 (δ(1)), G
∞
2 (δ(2)), . . ..
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APPENDIX
A Multi-Instance PRFs
In this section, we show that for any family of PRF, even polynomially many random members of
it are indistinguishable from polynomially many truly random functions.
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Lemma A.1. For all polynomials q, if {fs : {0, 1}
|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ is a pseudorandom function
ensemble, then the ensemble F q = {F 1n , . . . , F
q(n)
n }n∈N where, for all i, F
i
n is uniformly distributed
over the multiset {fs}s∈{0,1}n , is computationally indistinguishable from H
q = {H1n, . . . ,H
q(n)
n }n∈N.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the ensembles are distinguishable. This means there exist a
polynomial q, a PPT D, and a polynomial p such that for infinitely many n’s
|Pr[D(1n, (H1n, . . . ,H
q(n)
n )) = 1]− Pr[D(1
n, (F 1n , . . . , F
q(n)
n )) = 1]| >
1
p(n)
.
For each n, let T in = (1
n, (H1n, . . . ,H
i−1
n , F
i
n, . . . , F
q(n)
n )). We can now describe a PPT D′ that
distinguishes {Fn}n∈N and {Hn}n∈N for infinitely many n’s. First notice that a PPT can eas-
ily simulate polynomially many oracle queries to both a truly random function and to a mem-
ber of Fn. So D
′ on input (1n,X) randomly chooses j ∈ {1, . . . , q(n)} and calls D with input
(1n, (I1, . . . , Ij−1,X, J j+1, . . . , Jq(n))), where it simulates a query to Ik as a query to a random
member of Hn, and a query to Jk as a query to a random member of Fn. (Notice that since D is
a PPT, it can make only polynomially many oracle queries to any of the functions, which can be
easily simulated). Whenever D makes an oracle query to X, D′ makes an oracle query to X, and
uses its answer as the answer to D. When D terminates, D′ outputs the same value as D.
Now notice that if X is Hn, then the input to D is T
j
n, while if X is Fn, then the input to D is
T j+1n . Thus, Pr[D′(1n,Hn) = 1] =
1
q(n)
∑q(n)
i=1 Pr[D(T
i+1
n ) = 1], and
Pr[D′(1n, Fn) = 1] =
1
q(n)
∑q(n)
i=1 Pr[D(T
i
n) = 1]. It follows that
|Pr[D′(1n,Hn) = 1]− Pr[D
′(1n, Fn) = 1]| =
1
q(n)
|
q(n)∑
i=1
Pr[D(T i+1n ) = 1]− Pr[D(T
i
n) = 1]|
=
1
q(n)
|Pr[D(T q(n)+1n ) = 1]− Pr[D(T
1
n) = 1]|
>
1
q(n)p(n)
,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that T
q(n)+1
n = (1n, (H1n, . . . ,H
q(n)
n )) and
T 1n = (1
n, (F 1n , . . . , F
q(n)
n )). But this means that for any such n, D′ can distinguish F = {Fn}n∈N
and H = {Hn}n∈N with non-negligible probability, and thus can do that for infinitely many n’s.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that {fs : {0, 1}
|s| → {0, 1}|s|}s∈{0,1}∗ is a pseudorandom
function ensemble.
B Multi-key Multi-Message Security
In this section, we show that any secure public-key encryption scheme is also multi-key multi-
message secure.
Lemma B.1. If (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a secure public key encryption scheme, then it is also multi-
message multi-key secure.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a secure public key encryption scheme
that is not multi-message multi-key secure. Then there exist polynomials f and g and an adversary
A = (A1, A2) such that {IND-MULT
Π
0 (A, k, f, g)}k and {IND-MULT
Π
1 (A, k, f, g)}k are distinguish-
able. That means there exist a PPT D and a polynomial p such that
|Pr[D(1k, {IND-MULTΠ0 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]− Pr[D(1
k, {IND-MULTΠ1 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]| >
1
p(n)
.
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Let T πi,j(A, k, f, g) be the following PPT algorithm:
T πi,j(A, k, f, g) := (pk1, sk1)← Gen(1
k), . . . (pkg(k), skg(k))← Gen(1
k),
(m10, . . . ,m
f(k)
0 ,m
1
1, . . . ,m
f(k)
1 , τ)← A1(1
k, pk1, . . . , pkg(k))
C ← Encpk1(m
1
0), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m
1
0),
. . . ,Encpk1(m
j
0), . . . ,Encpki−1(m
j
0),Encpki(m
j
1), . . .Encpkg(k)(m
j
1),
. . .Encpk1(m
f(k)
1 ), . . . ,Encpkg(k)(m
f(k)
1 )
o← A2(C, τ)
Output o.
We now define an adversary A′ = (A′1, A
′
2), and show that {IND
Π
0 (A
′, k, f, g)}k
and {INDΠ1 (A
′, k, f, g)}k are not computationally indistinguishable. A
′
1 on input (1
k, pk)
first chooses i ∈ {1, . . . , g(k)} uniformly at random. It then generates g(k) − 1 ran-
dom key pairs (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pki−1, ski−1), (pki+1, ski+1), . . . , (pkg(k), skg(k)). It then
calls A1 with input (1
k, pk1, . . . , pki−1, pk, pki+1, . . . , pkg(k)). After getting A1’s output
M = (m10, . . . ,m
f(k)
0 ,m
1
1, . . . ,m
f(k)
1 , τ), A
′
1 chooses j ∈ {1, . . . , f(n)} uniformly at random,
and returns as its output (mj0,m
j
1, (i, j, pk, pk1, sk1, . . . , pkg(k), skg(k),M)).
A′2 on input (C, (i, j, pk, pk1, sk1, . . . , pkg(k), skg(k),M)) constructs input C
′ for A2 by first ap-
pending the encryptions of messages m10 . . . ,m
j−1
0 with all the keys, then appending the encryption
of mj0 with keys pk1, . . . , pki and then appends C. It then appends the encryption of m
j
1 with keys
pki+2, . . . , pkg(k) and also the encryption of the messages m
j+1
1 , . . . ,m
f(k)
1 with each of the keys. It
then outputs A2(C
′, τ). If C is the encryption of m0j with key pk, then this algorithm is identical to
T πi+1,j(A, k, f, g) (if i = g(k) then by T
π
i+1,j we mean T
π
1,j+1; we use similar conventions elsewhere),
while if it is the encryption of m1j with key pk, then the algorithm is identical to T
π
i,j(A, k, f, g).
We claim that D can distinguish {INDΠ0 (A
′, k, f, g)}k and {IND
Π
1 (A
′, k, f, g)}k . Note that
Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ0 (A
′, k, f, g)}) = 1] =
1
g(k)f(k)
f(k)∑
j=1
g(k)∑
i=1
Pr[D(1k, T πi+1,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1]
and
Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ1 (A
′, k, f, g)}) = 1] =
1
g(k)f(k)
f(k)∑
j=1
g(k)∑
i=1
Pr[D(1k, T πi,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1].
Thus,
|Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ0 (A
′, k, f, g)}) = 1]− Pr[D(1k, {INDΠ1 (A
′, k, f, g)}) = 1]|
= 1g(k)f(k) |
∑f(k)
j=1
∑g(k)
i=1 (Pr[D(1
k, T πi+1,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1]− Pr[D(1
k, T πi,j(A, k, f, g)) = 1])
= 1g(k)f(k) |Pr[D(1
k, {IND-MULTΠ0 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]− Pr[D(1
k, {IND-MULTΠ1 (A, k, f, g)}) = 1]|
> 1g(k)f(k)p(k) ,
where the next-to-last line follows because T π1,1(A, k, f, g) = IND-MULT
Π
1 (A, k, f, g) and
T πg(k)+1,f(k)(A, k, f, g) = IND-MULT
Π
0 (A, k, f, g). Thus, we have a contradiction to the fact that
the encryption scheme is secure.
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